The Anti-Federalists

"The anti-federalists," notes Ralph Ketcham in the introduction to a popular edition of their writings:

[Looked] to the Classical idealization of the small, pastoral republic where virtuous, self-reliant citizens managed their own affairs and shunned the power and glory of empire. To them, the victory in the American Revolution meant not so much the big chance to become a wealthy world power, but rather the opportunity to achieve a geniunely republican polity, far from the greed, lust for power, and tyranny that had generally characterized human society. ¹

In many ways, the group has been misnamed. After all, federalism refers to the system of decentralized government. As Mel Bradford notes, in the Virginia Convention, Patrick Henry, the leader of the Anti-Federalists "conjured up an image of the Constitution as it might become [and] much of his prophecy has been confirmed." ²

The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are a series of eight-five anonymous phamplets by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison urging for the ratification of the United States Constitution under the pseudonym "Publius." These papers were first published serially from October 1787 to August 1788 in New York City newspapers. Gottfried Dietze observes:

The political thinking of the Federalist was formed during the American Revolution, a period distinguished by the quest for individual freedom, for peace among states, and for security from foreign nations. ¹

Hamilton, Madison and Jay hoped to persuade a strong opposition in George Clinton's New York State to assent to ratifiction of the proposed Constitution. New York was of course a hotbed of Anti-Federalism at the time. Within the Federalist were answers to common objections and assuring acknowledgements that the proposed federal government was limited by Constitution to enumerated objects of power, and amenable to the states.

Federalist No. 10 The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (continued) Daily Advertiser Thursday, November 22, 1787 [James Madison] To the People of the State of New York: Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, nonedeserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American Constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and expected. Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, usually the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty; that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. . . . These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

The Federalist No. 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered New York Packet Friday, November 30, 1787 [James Madison] To the People of the State of New York: WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces. A few observations on this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that the adversaries of the new Constitution are availing themselves of the prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere of republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they endeavor in vain to find.

Federalist No. 39 Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles Independent Journal Wednesday, January 16, 1788 [James Madison] To the People of the State of New York: THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking. The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.